BAPTIST PRESS NEWS BPN
Supreme Court to weigh restriction on Jehovah's Witnesses home
visits
Oct 18, 2001
By Staff
WASHINGTON
(BP)--The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide if a local government can
require members of a religious group to obtain permits that include their names
before taking their message door to door.
The justices will review a ruling by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
that found an Ohio community could regulate the home visitation of the
Jehovah's Witnesses and other organizations. The Jehovah's Witnesses, a
religious group considered a cult by evangelical Christian bodies, challenged
the ordinance in Stratton, Ohio, as a violation of the First Amendment rights
of both speech and religious expression.
The justices, however, agreed to consider only the question of whether the
ordinance infringes on a previous high court ruling protecting anonymous
pamphleteering and speech. The justices are expected to hear oral arguments and
issue an opinion before their term ends early next summer.
The ordinance applies to people planning to visit residences for the
"purposes of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any
product, service, organization or cause." It requires an individual to
register with the mayor's office and to explain his cause and his reason for
home visitation. Any Stratton homeowner may file a form with the major saying
he does not want to be solicited and may post a sign at his residence to that
effect.
The Sixth Circuit upheld a federal court opinion, ruling the ordinance is
constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to comply with a government
interest.
The Jehovah's Witnesses argued on appeal that the Sixth Circuit decision
clashes with a 1995 Supreme Court opinion rejecting an Ohio law banning the
distribution of unsigned political pamphlets, according to The Washington Post.
The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Stratton, Ohio.
Other cases the high court has agreed to rule on during this term include:
-- Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which will determine whether a Cleveland, Ohio,
program allowing vouchers to be used at religious schools is constitutional. A
Sixth Circuit panel upheld a federal judge's opinion the program violates the
separation of church and state, because most of the private schools in which
vouchers are used by low-income families are religious ones. The Southern
Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission supports the school choice
program, while the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs opposes it. No date
has been set for oral arguments.
-- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, in which a lower court ruled as
unconstitutional the Child Pornography Protection Act, which expanded child
pornography bans to include computerized images. Oral arguments are scheduled
Oct. 30.
-- Ashcroft v. ACLU, wherein a federal appeals court blocked enforcement of the
Child Online Protection Act, which barred commercial websites from making
sexually explicit material available to minors. The justices will hear
arguments Nov. 28.
-- Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, in which a lower court ruled against an
ordinance prohibiting more than one sexually explicit business in the same
building. Oral arguments will be Dec. 4.
http://www.sbc.net/redirect.asp?url=http://www.bpnews.net/ 8/4/03
BAPTIST PRESS NEWS BPN
High court strikes down door-to-door regulation
Jun 18, 2002
By Tom Strode
WASHINGTON
(BP)--An Ohio town ordinance that regulates door-to-door canvassing violates
the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled June 17.
The decision is considered a victory not only for Jehovah's Witnesses, the
religious group that brought the suit, but Christians and others who do
unsolicited visitation to homes.
The high court voted 8-1 to reverse a lower court opinion that had upheld a
measure adopted in the Village of Stratton, Ohio, that required a permit before
a person could go on private property to advocate a cause, sell a product or
promote an organization. The ordinance affected religious adherents, political
candidates, community groups and salespeople.
"I am delighted that the Supreme Court has chosen to affirm religious
liberty and freedom of speech," said Richard Land, president of the
Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission. "Any other
decision would have been a disaster for First Amendment freedoms in
America."
The 8-1 vote "is good news ... real good news," Land said.
"Hopefully, the 8-1 decision portends more good news to come from this
court in the immediate future."
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which often clashes with
the ERLC and other religious freedom organizations, also welcomed the ruling.
"People who want to talk about their views with others shouldn't have to
ask the government for permission first," AU Executive Director Barry Lynn
said in a written statement. "People who are bothered by door-to-door
evangelism can always say, 'No, thanks,' and shut the door or post a 'No
soliciting' sign. Heavy-handed government regulations on speech stifle our
basic freedoms."
In the majority opinion, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens said the ordinance
had a "pernicious effect."
"It is offensive - not only to the values protected by the First
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society - that in the context of
everyday discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to
speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so," Stevens wrote.
"Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial
task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring
a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our
national heritage and constitutional tradition."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented, defending Stratton's interests in
"protecting privacy and preventing fraud and crime." The ordinance is
"at most, a negligible burden on door-to-door communication," he
wrote.
The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, a corporation that
coordinates the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses, brought suit against
Stratton after the ordinance was adopted. Jehovah's Witnesses, considered a
cult by evangelical Christian bodies because of unorthodox teachings on Jesus
and salvation, often go door-to-door distributing their publications.
After a federal court ruled in favor of Stratton, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court. The appeals court described the ordinance
as "content neutral" and not overly broad.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the appeals court ruling, focusing on
whether the ordinance violated a previous high court opinion protecting
anonymous pamphleteering and speech. In his opinion, Stevens cited Supreme
Court decisions from the 1930s and 1940s in which the justices struck down
limitations on "door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering" that
involved Jehovah's Witnesses. The group believes such activity is commanded by
their scriptures.
The Stratton ordinance requires an individual to register with the mayor's
office and to explain his cause and reason for home visitation.
The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton.
The high court is expected to release another major church-state opinion before
it adjourns for the term. The Zelman v. Simmons-Harris ruling will determine
whether a Cleveland, Ohio, program allowing vouchers to be used at religious
schools is constitutional. The court is expected to adjourn by the first of
July.
http://www.sbc.net/redirect.asp?url=http://www.bpnews.net/ 8/4/03
PITTSBURGH POST GAZZETTE
Supreme
Court upholds right of religious groups to go door-to-door without permits
Tuesday, June 18, 2002
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- The Constitution protects the right of missionaries,
politicians and others to knock on doors without first getting permission from
local authorities, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The court struck down a local law that leaders of a small Ohio town said was
meant to protect elderly residents from being bothered at home -- a law
challenged by the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion calls for doorstep
proselytizing.
In other cases decided Monday, the justices:
Ruled that police who want to look for drugs
or evidence of other crimes do not have to first inform public transportation
passengers of their legal rights. The court rejected arguments that passengers,
confined to small spaces, might feel coerced.
Decided that the Internal Revenue Service can
use estimates of cash tips received by restaurant staff to make sure it is
collecting enough Social Security taxes from their employers.
Rejected arguments that Texas redistricting
hurt Hispanics. The justices, without hearing arguments, affirmed congressional
and state legislative boundaries that favor Republicans.
Barred Americans from seeking punitive
damages from cities and government boards that refuse to build wheelchair ramps
and make other accommodations for the disabled.
In the doorstep-solicitation case, by a vote of 8 to 1, the court reasoned
that the First Amendment right to free speech includes the entitlement to take
a message directly to someone's door, and that the right cannot be limited by a
requirement to register by name ahead of time.
"The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises
constitutional concerns," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
"It is offensive, not only to the values protected by the First
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society, that in the context of
everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her
desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so."
Two of the court's most conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, agreed with the outcome of the case but did not sign on to Stevens'
reasoning.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.
Barry Lynn, executive director of the Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, said the court got it right.
"It seems that the court has simply said once again that you shouldn't
have to get the government's permission to spread your views," Lynn said.
"People have the right not to listen or to close their doors, but the
government is not supposed to be in that door closing business."
Stratton, Ohio, required a permit for any door-to-door soliciting by
salesmen or anyone else. Theoretically, girl scouts would have to get such a
permit to sell cookies, as would a candidate for the school board or a student
raising money for a class trip.
The majority in Monday's case said the law was too
broad. Had it been much more narrowly written to guard against unwanted sales
calls, it might have withstood constitutional scrutiny, Stevens wrote.
http://www.post-gazette.com/FirstAmendment/top
Monday, July 21, 2003
USA
June 18,
2002 VNN7390
![]()
Court Tosses Door Solicitations
Law
![]()
FROM AP
![]()
USA, Jun 18 (VNN) — ANNE
GEARAN - Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Constitution guarantees religious groups, politicians,
Girl Scouts and others the right to knock on their neighbors' doors without
stopping at town hall for permission, the Supreme Court ruled Monday in a broad
endorsement of free speech rights.
By a vote of 8-1 the high court struck down an Ohio village's law that required
anyone going door to door to register with authorities and carry a permit.
Violators could be fined $100.
"It is offensive, not only to the values protected by the First Amendment
but to the very notion of a free society, that in the context of everyday
public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to
speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so," Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote for the majority.
The mayor of the tiny Stratton, Ohio, population 287, said the law was intended
to protect elderly residents against flimflam artists or pesky salesmen. The
Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion mandates doorstep proselytizing, objected,
saying the law was largely aimed at keeping them out of town.
The law was too broad and affected too many kinds of encounters, Stevens wrote
for himself and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
He noted that residents could file a form to specifically allow visits from
Girl Scouts, Christmas carolers or Halloween trick-or-treaters, among others,
but that the law seemed to ban those groups from operating unless they had a permit.
Had the ordinance been narrower, it might have withstood constitutional
scrutiny, Stevens wrote for the majority.
Two of the court's most conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, agreed with the outcome of the case but did not sign on to all of
Stevens' reasoning.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.
"The court once again reaffirmed the fundamental protection of our public
ministry under the First Amendment," church lawyer Paul Polidoro said.
"Eight justices of the Supreme Court saw the importance of our public
ministry ... and that it deserved all the protection the First Amendment could
provide."
The church won victories in the 1930s and 1940s that have helped form the
court's modern interpretation of the First Amendment.
Taking note of the World War II-era cases, Stevens wrote: "The value
judgment that then motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend
those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our
decision today."
Stratton Village Solicitor Frank Bruzzese defended the law, saying it was
"narrowly drawn to regulate only entry onto private property." Town
leaders said they are still evaluating their next step.
Monday's case turned in part on the notion of anonymity when speaking one's
mind.
The court already has held that the Constitution gives people the right to
anonymously distribute campaign literature. Monday's ruling extends that right
to door-to-door soliciting for other causes.
The Jehovah's Witnesses, who count 6 million practicing members worldwide,
routinely knock on doors and ask to talk about religion. They often offer
biblical tracts and say they accept donations but do not ask for them.
The church argued that it needs no one's permission to pursue its mission, and
objected to registering by name for a permit. Someone going door to door may
choose to introduce himself but should not be required to do so, the church
argued.
Two lower federal courts found the permit rules evenhanded, and the church
appealed to the Supreme Court.
The court majority found none of the town's reasoning persuasive.
People who do not want to listen to a political candidate or other canvasser
don't have to do so, the court said. Residents may post a "No
Solicitations" sign at the door, or simply refuse to engage in
conversation.
As for the idea that the law could deter crime, Stevens said it is unlikely
that a criminal casing a neighborhood would be put off by the need to get a
permit.
Rehnquist's dissent mentioned the killings of two college professors in New
Hampshire by two teen-agers who said they got into the house on the pretext of
taking a survey.
Stratton's law was intended to address such "very grave risks associated
with canvassing," and did not unduly limit free speech, Rehnquist wrote.
Jehovah's Witnesses callers will soon ring doorbells in Stratton, church lawyer
Paul Polidoro said.
"Some will be receptive, some not. But it's the homeowner's decision
whether to listen or not," Polidoro said.
The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc. v. Village of
Stratton, Ohio, et al., 00-1737.
http://www.vnn.org/usa/US0206/US18-7390.html Monday, July 21, 2003
LEGAL UPDATE ON
YOUR RIGHT TO WITNESS
Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. __, 122 S. Ct. 2080
(2002).
Last summer, the United
States Supreme Court decided a case that is a big win for soulwinners. The
Court held that it is unconstitutional to require door-to-door visitors to
obtain a permit before they engage in visitation activities, including
soulwinning.
I. SIGNIFICANT FACTS
The Village of Stratton,
Ohio, enacted an ordinance that prohibited “canvassers” from “going in and
upon” private residential property to promote any “cause” without first
obtaining a “solicitation permit” from the mayor’s office (Village of Stratton
Ordinance No. 1998-5 §116.01). In order to receive the permit, the ordinance
required canvassers to fill out a detailed registration form, which required
the following information:
Under the ordinance, a
canvasser would, after receiving a permit, be authorized to go upon the
premises that he listed on the registration form. However, the canvasser would
be required to carry the permit on his person and exhibit it whenever requested
to do so by a police officer or a resident. Anyone who failed or refused to
apply for and receive a solicitation permit prior to engaging in canvassing
activities could be charged with a misdemeanor.
II. CONCLUSION
Any law that makes it
illegal to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with a
governmental official or agency and receiving a permit violates the First
Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech,
and the distribution of handbills.
III. REASONING
A. The permit requirement places too much of a burden on free speech.
1. Hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary
evangelism, as old as the history of the printing presses.
2. Pamphlets have proved to be valuable instruments in the dissemination
of opinion, and the most effective way of bringing pamphlets to the notice of
individuals is their distribution at people’s homes.
3. Door-to-door distribution of literature is essential to poorly
financed causes.
4. The permit requirement would have applied to the following
speech-related activities:
a. Trick-or-treating;
b. Camp Fire Girls selling cookies or candy;
c. Religious proselytizing;
d. Political campaigning; and
e. Residents promoting a religious or political cause to their neighbor.
5. The permit requirement would effectively ban a significant amount of
spontaneous speech. For example:
a. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an
active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until
after he or she obtained the required permit.
b. A resident could not go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote
against the mayor until he first obtained the mayor’s permission.
B. The permit requirement is not tailored to the government’s stated
interests:
1. Preventing fraud—The permit requirement may advance an interest in
preventing fraud if the activities regulated were commercial transactions or
the solicitation of funds. However, this interest provides no support for the
ordinance’s application to petitioners, to religious canvassers, to political
campaigns, or to the enlisting of support for unpopular causes.
2. Preventing crime—The absence of a permit is unlikely to deter
criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by
the ordinance, such as asking for directions, requesting permission to use the
telephone, or posing as a surveyor or census taker. Neither does the permit
requirement preclude a criminal from registering under a false name with
impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an
applicant’s identity or organizational credentials.
3. Protecting residential privacy—Residents have the right to post a no
trespassing or no soliciting sign, to refuse to engage in conversation with
unwelcome visitors, and to report trespassers or loiterers to the police if
their wishes are not honored.
C. Key Quote:
It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the
First Amendment, but the notion of a free society – that in the context of
everyday public discourse a citizen must inform the government of her desire to
speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance
of permits by the mayor’s office is a ministerial task that is performed
promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in
such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and
constitutional tradition.
Watchtower, 122 S. Ct. at 2094.
Download the full text (including the majority opinion and
all concurring opinions and dissenting opinions) of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village
of Stratton.
http://www.christianlaw.org/watchtower.html Monday, July 21, 2003
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 1 Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No.
00?737
_________________
WATCHTOWER
BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET
AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF
STRATTON ET AL.
ON WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June
17, 2002]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to
engage in door-to-door advocacy with-out first registering with the mayor and
receiving a per-mit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial
challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regu-lation not only as it
applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and
the distribution of handbills.
I
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York,
Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses
throughout the United States and pub-lishes Bibles and religious periodicals
that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah抯
Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a
part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer
religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They
allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders
2 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do
accept
donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village
and
its
mayor in the United States District Court for the
Southern
District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against
the
enforcement of several sections of Ordinance
No.
1998? regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation
on
private property in the Village. Petitioners?complaint
alleged
that the ordinance violated several constitutional
rights,
including the free exercise of religion, free speech,
and the
freedom of the press. App. 10a?4a. The District
Court
conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the
administration
of the ordinance and its effect on petition-
ers was
introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits 揷anvassers?and others
from
揼oing
in and upon?private residential property for the
purpose of
promoting any 揷ause?without first having
obtained
a permit pursuant to ?16.03.1 That section
棗棗棗
1Section 116.01 provides:
揟he practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private
residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors,
peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or
services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such
private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant
to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting,
selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for
the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or
services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.?App. to Brief for
Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term 揷an-vassers?to
include Jehovah抯 Witnesses and the term 揷ause?to include their
ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor
since such an individual would not be entering private property 揻or the
purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product,
service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the
sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services.?Thus, contrary to the assumption
of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post,
at 2, 7, 9, the Village抯 ordinance would have done nothing to prevent
that tragic crime.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 3 Opinion of the Court
provides that any canvasser who intends to go on
private property to promote a cause, must obtain a 揝olicitation
Permit?from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and
apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly
detailed 揝olicitor抯 Registration Form.2 The canvasser
is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form,
but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested
to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds
for the denial
棗棗棗
2Section 116.03
provides:
?a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant
merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section
116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private prop-erty or a
private residence in the Village for any of the purposes de-scribed in Section
116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first
registering in the office of the Mayor and ob-taining a Solicitation Permit.
?b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall
be made by filing a Solicitor抯 Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor,
on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the
Registrant and it shall then contain the following information:
?1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant抯
residence for five years next preceding the date of registration;
?2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of
the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or
services offered;
?3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated
organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the
exact relationship and authority of the Applicant;
?4) The length of time for which the privilege to
canvass or solicit is desired;
?5) The specific address of each private residence at
which the Reg-istrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section
116.01 of this Chapter, and,
?6) Such other information concerning the Registrant
and its busi-ness or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately
describe the nature of the privilege desired.?Brief for Respondents 3a?a.
3Section 116.04 provides:
揈ach Registrant who complies with Sec-
4 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
or revocation of a permit,4 but the
record before us does
not show
that any application has been denied or that any
permit
has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a
permit.
A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not
chal-
lenge
establishes a procedure by which a resident may
prohibit
solicitation even by holders of permits. If the
resident
files a 揘o Solicitation Registration Form?with
the mayor,
and also posts a 揘o Solicitation?sign on his
property,
no uninvited canvassers may enter his property,
unless they
are specifically authorized to do so in the 揘o
Solicitation Registration Form?itself.5 Only 32
of the
棗棗棗
tion 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation
Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required
by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any
premises not listed on the Registrant抯 Solicitor抯 Registration
Form.
揈ach person shall at all times, while exercising
the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his
permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested
to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.?Id., at
4a.
4Section 116.06 provides:
揚ermits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or revoked
by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons:
?a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant
in the Solici-tor's Registration Form.
?b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor抯
Registra-tion Form.
?c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made
in the course of conducting the activity.
?d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter
or of other Codi-fied Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law.
?e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in
such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property.
?f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications
required in this chapter for the original registration.?Id., at 5a.
5Section 116.07
provides, in part: ?a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of
this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corpora-tion who is the owner or lawful
occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of
Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 5 Opinion of the Court
Village抯 278 residents filed such forms. Each
of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident
checked 17 exceptions, thereby ex-cluding only 揓ehovah抯
Witnesses?and 揚olitical Candi-dates?from the list of invited canvassers.
Although Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses do not consider themselves to be
棗棗棗
practice of going in or upon the private property
and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited
canvassers, solici-tors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient
vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this
Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads 慛o
Solicitation?in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to
enter upon such property.
?b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a)
hereof shall be made by filing a 慛o Solicitation Registration Form? at
the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall
be com-pleted by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the
following information: . . . .?Id., at 6a.
6The suggested
exceptions listed on the form are:
1. Scouting Organizations
2. Camp Fire Girls
3. Children抯 Sports Organizations
4. Children抯 Solicitation for Supporting School
Activities
5. Volunteer Fire Dept.
6. Jehovah抯 Witnesses
7. Political Candidates
8. Beauty Products Sales People
9. Watkins Sales
10. Christmas Carolers
11. Parcel Delivery
12. Little League
13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season
14. Police
15. Campaigners
16. Newspaper Carriers
17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church
18. Food Salesmen
19. Salespersons. App. 229a.
Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these
19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.
6 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
搒olicitors?because they make no charge for
their litera-
ture or
their teaching, leaders of the church testified at
trial that
they would honor 搉o solicitation?signs in the
Village.
They also explained at trial that they did not
apply
for a permit because they derive their authority to
preach from
Scripture.7 揊or us to seek a permit from a
municipality
to preach we feel would almost be an insult
to
God.?App. 321a.
Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance
was the product
of the mayor抯 hostility to their ministry,
but the District
Court credited the mayor抯 testimony that
it had
been designed to protect the privacy rights of the
Village residents,
specifically to protect them 揻rom 慺lim
flam?con
artists who prey on small town populations.?61
F. Supp.
2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the
court
concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to
the activities
of petitioners as well as to 揵usiness or po-
litical
canvassers,?id., at 737, 738.
The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordi-
nance as
valid, content-neutral regulations that did not
infringe
on petitioners?First Amendment rights. The
court
did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing
constructions
of three provisions. First, the court viewed
the
requirement in ?16.03(b)(5) that the applicant must
list the
specific address of each residence to be visited as
potentially
invalid, but cured by the Village抯 agreement to
attach
to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737.
Second,
it held that petitioners could comply with
?16.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as 搕he
棗棗棗
7Specifically,
from the Book of 揗atthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as
our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by exam-ple, instituted a
house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And
that抯 the activity that Jehovah抯 Witnesses engage in, even as
Christ抯 apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.?Id., at
313a?14a.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 7 Opinion of the Court
Jehovah抯
Witness ministry.?Id., at 738. And third, it
held
that ?16.05, which limited canvassing to the hours
before 5
p.m., was invalid on its face and should be re-
placed with
a provision referring to 搑easonable hours of
the
day.?Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the
ordinance
constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners
and
dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
240
F. 3d
553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was 揷ontent
neutral
and of general applicability and therefore subject
to
intermediate scrutiny.?Id., at 560. It rejected petition-
ers?reliance
on the discussion of laws affecting both the
free
exercise of religion and free speech in Employment
Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U. S.
872
(1990),8 because that 搇anguage was dicta and therefore
not
binding.?240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners?
argument
that the ordinance is overbroad because it im-
pairs
the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that
we recognized
in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm地, 514
U. S. 334 (1995), reasoning that 搕he very act
of going door-
棗棗棗
The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amend-ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-iously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-tional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S., at 304?07 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and
charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a
license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invali-dating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to
the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321
U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of
their children, see Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating
compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on
religious grounds to send their children to school).?494 U. S., at 881
(footnote omitted).
88 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of
their identities.?240 F. 3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals con-cluded that the interests
promoted by the Village棑pro-tecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance敆as
well as the harm that it seeks to prevent棑criminals posing as canvassers
in order to defraud its residents敆though 揵y no means
overwhelming,?were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565?66.
The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovah抯 Witnesses
ministry because those cases either involved a flat prohibition on the
dissemi-nation of ideas, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U. S. 141 (1943), or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the
discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296, 302 (1940).
In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by
subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit re-quirements, the
ordinance significantly restricted a sub-stantial quantity of speech unrelated
to the Village抯 interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In
his view, the Village 揻ailed to demonstrate either the reality of the
harm or the efficacy of the restriction.?240 F. 3d, at 572.
We granted certiorari to decide the following
question: 揇oes a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a
permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and
to display upon demand the permit, which contains one抯 name, violate the
First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or
dis-course??534 U. S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9
棗棗棗
9In their briefs
and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual issue embedded in the
question presented, namely, whether the permit contains the speaker抯
name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to answer whether the
ordinance抯 registration requirement abridges so much protected speech
that it is invalid on its face.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 9 Opinion of the Court
II
For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated
restrictions
on
door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is
more
than historical accident that most of these cases
involved
First Amendment challenges brought by Jeho-
vah抯
Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is man-
dated by
their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943), the Jehovah抯
Witnesses
揷laim
to follow the example of Paul, teaching 憄ublicly, and
from
house to house.?Acts 20:20. They take literally the
mandate of
the Scriptures, 慓o ye into all the world, and
preach
the gospel to every creature.?Mark 16:15. In doing
so they
believe that they are obeying a commandment of
God.?Moreover,
because they lack significant financial
resources,
the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is
seriously
diminished by regulations that burden their efforts
to
canvass door-to-door.
Although our past cases involving Jehovah抯
Witnesses,
most of
which were decided shortly before and during
World
War II, do not directly control the question we
confront
today, they provide both a historical and analyti-
cal
backdrop for consideration of petitioners?First
Amendment
claim that the breadth of the Village抯 ordi-
nance offends
the First Amendment.11 Those cases in-
volved
petty offenses that raised constitutional questions
of the most serious magnitude梣uestions
that implicated 棗棗棗
10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610
(1976); Mar-tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider
v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
11The question
presented is similar to one raised, but not decided in Hynes. The
ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness grounds required
advance notice to the police before 揷asually soliciting the votes of
neighbors.?425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.
10 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech,
and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide
our consideration of the ordi-nance at issue here.
First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech
in-volved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court
noted that 揾and distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism梐s old as the history of printing presses. It has
been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. . .
. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has
the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exer-cises
of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.?319 U. S., at 109.
In addition, the cases discuss extensively the
historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles
for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of
Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the peti-tioner was a Jehovah抯
Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence
that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets.
Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that 損am-phlets have
proved most effective instruments in the dis-semination of opinion. And perhaps
the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their
distri-bution at the homes of the people. On this method of com-munication the
ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England
which eventu-ated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the
press embodied in our Constitution. To require a cen-sorship through license
which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets
strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.?Id., at 164
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 1 Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No.
00?737
_________________
WATCHTOWER
BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET
AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF
STRATTON ET AL.
ON WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June
17, 2002]
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to
engage in door-to-door advocacy with-out first registering with the mayor and
receiving a per-mit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial
challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regu-lation not only as it
applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and
the distribution of handbills.
I
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York,
Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses
throughout the United States and pub-lishes Bibles and religious periodicals
that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah抯
Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a
part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer
religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They
allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders
2 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do
accept
donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village
and
its
mayor in the United States District Court for the
Southern
District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against
the
enforcement of several sections of Ordinance
No.
1998? regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation
on
private property in the Village. Petitioners?complaint
alleged
that the ordinance violated several constitutional
rights,
including the free exercise of religion, free speech,
and the
freedom of the press. App. 10a?4a. The District
Court
conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the
administration
of the ordinance and its effect on petition-
ers was
introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits 揷anvassers?and others
from
揼oing
in and upon?private residential property for the
purpose of
promoting any 揷ause?without first having
obtained
a permit pursuant to ?16.03.1 That section
棗棗棗
1Section 116.01 provides:
揟he practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private
residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors,
peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or
services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such
private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant
to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting,
selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for
the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or
services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.?App. to Brief for
Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term 揷an-vassers?to
include Jehovah抯 Witnesses and the term 揷ause?to include their
ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor
since such an individual would not be entering private property 揻or the
purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product,
service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the
sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services.?Thus, contrary to the assumption
of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post,
at 2, 7, 9, the Village抯 ordinance would have done nothing to prevent
that tragic crime.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 3 Opinion of the Court
provides that any canvasser who intends to go on
private property to promote a cause, must obtain a 揝olicitation
Permit?from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and
apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly
detailed 揝olicitor抯 Registration Form.2 The canvasser
is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form,
but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested
to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds
for the denial
棗棗棗
2Section 116.03
provides:
?a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant
merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in
Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private
prop-erty or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes
de-scribed in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or
residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and ob-taining a
Solicitation Permit.
?b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall
be made by filing a Solicitor抯 Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor,
on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the
Registrant and it shall then contain the following information:
?1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant抯
residence for five years next preceding the date of registration;
?2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of
the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or
services offered;
?3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated
organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the
exact relationship and authority of the Applicant;
?4) The length of time for which the privilege to
canvass or solicit is desired;
?5) The specific address of each private residence at which
the Reg-istrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of
this Chapter, and,
?6) Such other information concerning the Registrant
and its busi-ness or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately
describe the nature of the privilege desired.?Brief for Respondents 3a?a.
3Section 116.04 provides:
揈ach Registrant who complies with Sec-
4 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
or revocation of a permit,4 but the
record before us does
not show
that any application has been denied or that any
permit
has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a
permit.
A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not
chal-
lenge
establishes a procedure by which a resident may
prohibit
solicitation even by holders of permits. If the
resident
files a 揘o Solicitation Registration Form?with
the mayor,
and also posts a 揘o Solicitation?sign on his
property,
no uninvited canvassers may enter his property,
unless they
are specifically authorized to do so in the 揘o
Solicitation Registration Form?itself.5 Only 32
of the
棗棗棗
tion 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation
Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required
by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any
premises not listed on the Registrant抯 Solicitor抯 Registration
Form.
揈ach person shall at all times, while exercising
the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his
permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested
to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.?Id., at
4a.
4Section 116.06 provides:
揚ermits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or
revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons:
?a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant
in the Solici-tor's Registration Form.
?b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor抯
Registra-tion Form.
?c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made
in the course of conducting the activity.
?d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter
or of other Codi-fied Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law.
?e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in
such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property.
?f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications
required in this chapter for the original registration.?Id., at 5a.
5Section 116.07 provides,
in part: ?a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this
Chapter 116, any person, firm or corpora-tion who is the owner or lawful
occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of
Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 5 Opinion of the Court
Village抯 278 residents filed such forms. Each
of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident
checked 17 exceptions, thereby ex-cluding only 揓ehovah抯
Witnesses?and 揚olitical Candi-dates?from the list of invited canvassers.
Although Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses do not consider themselves to be
棗棗棗
practice of going in or upon the private property
and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited
canvassers, solici-tors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient
vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this
Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads 慛o
Solicitation?in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to
enter upon such property.
?b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a)
hereof shall be made by filing a 慛o Solicitation Registration Form? at
the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall
be com-pleted by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the
following information: . . . .?Id., at 6a.
6The suggested
exceptions listed on the form are:
1. Scouting Organizations
2. Camp Fire Girls
3. Children抯 Sports Organizations
4. Children抯 Solicitation for Supporting School
Activities
5. Volunteer Fire Dept.
6. Jehovah抯 Witnesses
7. Political Candidates
8. Beauty Products Sales People
9. Watkins Sales
10. Christmas Carolers
11. Parcel Delivery
12. Little League
13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season
14. Police
15. Campaigners
16. Newspaper Carriers
17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church
18. Food Salesmen
19. Salespersons. App. 229a.
Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these
19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.
6 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.
VILLAGE OF STRATTON
Opinion of the Court
搒olicitors?because they make no charge for
their litera-
ture or their
teaching, leaders of the church testified at
trial that
they would honor 搉o solicitation?signs in the
Village.
They also explained at trial that they did not
apply
for a permit because they derive their authority to
preach
from Scripture.7 揊or us to seek a permit from a
municipality
to preach we feel would almost be an insult
to
God.?App. 321a.
Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance
was the product
of the mayor抯 hostility to their ministry,
but the District
Court credited the mayor抯 testimony that
it had
been designed to protect the privacy rights of the
Village residents,
specifically to protect them 揻rom 慺lim
flam?con
artists who prey on small town populations.?61
F. Supp.
2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the
court
concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to
the activities
of petitioners as well as to 揵usiness or po-
litical
canvassers,?id., at 737, 738.
The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordi-
nance as
valid, content-neutral regulations that did not
infringe
on petitioners?First Amendment rights. The
court
did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing
constructions
of three provisions. First, the court viewed
the
requirement in ?16.03(b)(5) that the applicant must
list the
specific address of each residence to be visited as
potentially
invalid, but cured by the Village抯 agreement to
attach
to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737.
Second,
it held that petitioners could comply with
?16.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as 搕he
棗棗棗
7Specifically,
from the Book of 揗atthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as
our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by exam-ple, instituted a
house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And
that抯 the activity that Jehovah抯 Witnesses engage in, even as
Christ抯 apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.?Id., at
313a?14a.
Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 7 Opinion of the Court
Jehovah抯
Witness ministry.?Id., at 738. And third, it
held
that ?16.05, which limited canvassing to the hours
before 5
p.m., was invalid on its face and should be re-
placed with
a provision referring to 搑easonable hours of
the
day.?Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the
ordinance
constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners
and
dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
240
F. 3d
553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was 揷ontent
neutral
and of general applicability and therefore subject
to
intermediate scrutiny.?Id., at 560. It rejected petition-
ers?reliance
on the discussion of laws affecting both the
free
exercise of religion and free speech in Employment
Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U. S.
872
(1990),8 because that 搇anguage was dicta and therefore
not binding.?240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioner