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BAPTIST PRESS NEWS BPN

Supreme Court to weigh restriction on Jehovah's Witnesses home visits
Oct 18, 2001
By Staff

WASHINGTON (BP)--The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide if a local government can require members of a religious group to obtain permits that include their names before taking their message door to door.

The justices will review a ruling by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that found an Ohio community could regulate the home visitation of the Jehovah's Witnesses and other organizations. The Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious group considered a cult by evangelical Christian bodies, challenged the ordinance in Stratton, Ohio, as a violation of the First Amendment rights of both speech and religious expression.

The justices, however, agreed to consider only the question of whether the ordinance infringes on a previous high court ruling protecting anonymous pamphleteering and speech. The justices are expected to hear oral arguments and issue an opinion before their term ends early next summer.

The ordinance applies to people planning to visit residences for the "purposes of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause." It requires an individual to register with the mayor's office and to explain his cause and his reason for home visitation. Any Stratton homeowner may file a form with the major saying he does not want to be solicited and may post a sign at his residence to that effect.

The Sixth Circuit upheld a federal court opinion, ruling the ordinance is constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to comply with a government interest.

The Jehovah's Witnesses argued on appeal that the Sixth Circuit decision clashes with a 1995 Supreme Court opinion rejecting an Ohio law banning the distribution of unsigned political pamphlets, according to The Washington Post.

The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Stratton, Ohio.

Other cases the high court has agreed to rule on during this term include:

-- Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which will determine whether a Cleveland, Ohio, program allowing vouchers to be used at religious schools is constitutional. A Sixth Circuit panel upheld a federal judge's opinion the program violates the separation of church and state, because most of the private schools in which vouchers are used by low-income families are religious ones. The Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission supports the school choice program, while the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs opposes it. No date has been set for oral arguments.

-- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, in which a lower court ruled as unconstitutional the Child Pornography Protection Act, which expanded child pornography bans to include computerized images. Oral arguments are scheduled Oct. 30.

-- Ashcroft v. ACLU, wherein a federal appeals court blocked enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, which barred commercial websites from making sexually explicit material available to minors. The justices will hear arguments Nov. 28.

-- Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, in which a lower court ruled against an ordinance prohibiting more than one sexually explicit business in the same building. Oral arguments will be Dec. 4.

http://www.sbc.net/redirect.asp?url=http://www.bpnews.net/     8/4/03

 

BAPTIST PRESS NEWS BPN

High court strikes down door-to-door regulation
Jun 18, 2002
By Tom Strode

WASHINGTON (BP)--An Ohio town ordinance that regulates door-to-door canvassing violates the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled June 17.

The decision is considered a victory not only for Jehovah's Witnesses, the religious group that brought the suit, but Christians and others who do unsolicited visitation to homes.

The high court voted 8-1 to reverse a lower court opinion that had upheld a measure adopted in the Village of Stratton, Ohio, that required a permit before a person could go on private property to advocate a cause, sell a product or promote an organization. The ordinance affected religious adherents, political candidates, community groups and salespeople.

"I am delighted that the Supreme Court has chosen to affirm religious liberty and freedom of speech," said Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission. "Any other decision would have been a disaster for First Amendment freedoms in America."

The 8-1 vote "is good news ... real good news," Land said. "Hopefully, the 8-1 decision portends more good news to come from this court in the immediate future."

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which often clashes with the ERLC and other religious freedom organizations, also welcomed the ruling.

"People who want to talk about their views with others shouldn't have to ask the government for permission first," AU Executive Director Barry Lynn said in a written statement. "People who are bothered by door-to-door evangelism can always say, 'No, thanks,' and shut the door or post a 'No soliciting' sign. Heavy-handed government regulations on speech stifle our basic freedoms."

In the majority opinion, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens said the ordinance had a "pernicious effect."

"It is offensive - not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society - that in the context of everyday discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so," Stevens wrote. "Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition."

Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented, defending Stratton's interests in "protecting privacy and preventing fraud and crime." The ordinance is "at most, a negligible burden on door-to-door communication," he wrote.

The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, a corporation that coordinates the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses, brought suit against Stratton after the ordinance was adopted. Jehovah's Witnesses, considered a cult by evangelical Christian bodies because of unorthodox teachings on Jesus and salvation, often go door-to-door distributing their publications.

After a federal court ruled in favor of Stratton, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court. The appeals court described the ordinance as "content neutral" and not overly broad.

The Supreme Court agreed to review the appeals court ruling, focusing on whether the ordinance violated a previous high court opinion protecting anonymous pamphleteering and speech. In his opinion, Stevens cited Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s and 1940s in which the justices struck down limitations on "door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering" that involved Jehovah's Witnesses. The group believes such activity is commanded by their scriptures.

The Stratton ordinance requires an individual to register with the mayor's office and to explain his cause and reason for home visitation.

The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Village of Stratton.

The high court is expected to release another major church-state opinion before it adjourns for the term. The Zelman v. Simmons-Harris ruling will determine whether a Cleveland, Ohio, program allowing vouchers to be used at religious schools is constitutional. The court is expected to adjourn by the first of July.

http://www.sbc.net/redirect.asp?url=http://www.bpnews.net/     8/4/03

 

 

 

 

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PITTSBURGH POST GAZZETTE

 

Supreme Court upholds right of religious groups to go door-to-door without permits

Tuesday, June 18, 2002

The Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- The Constitution protects the right of missionaries, politicians and others to knock on doors without first getting permission from local authorities, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.

The court struck down a local law that leaders of a small Ohio town said was meant to protect elderly residents from being bothered at home -- a law challenged by the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion calls for doorstep proselytizing.

In other cases decided Monday, the justices:

Ruled that police who want to look for drugs or evidence of other crimes do not have to first inform public transportation passengers of their legal rights. The court rejected arguments that passengers, confined to small spaces, might feel coerced.

Decided that the Internal Revenue Service can use estimates of cash tips received by restaurant staff to make sure it is collecting enough Social Security taxes from their employers.

Rejected arguments that Texas redistricting hurt Hispanics. The justices, without hearing arguments, affirmed congressional and state legislative boundaries that favor Republicans.

Barred Americans from seeking punitive damages from cities and government boards that refuse to build wheelchair ramps and make other accommodations for the disabled.

In the doorstep-solicitation case, by a vote of 8 to 1, the court reasoned that the First Amendment right to free speech includes the entitlement to take a message directly to someone's door, and that the right cannot be limited by a requirement to register by name ahead of time.

"The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.

"It is offensive, not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society, that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so."

Two of the court's most conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, agreed with the outcome of the case but did not sign on to Stevens' reasoning.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.

Barry Lynn, executive director of the Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, said the court got it right.

"It seems that the court has simply said once again that you shouldn't have to get the government's permission to spread your views," Lynn said.

"People have the right not to listen or to close their doors, but the government is not supposed to be in that door closing business."

Stratton, Ohio, required a permit for any door-to-door soliciting by salesmen or anyone else. Theoretically, girl scouts would have to get such a permit to sell cookies, as would a candidate for the school board or a student raising money for a class trip.

The majority in Monday's case said the law was too broad. Had it been much more narrowly written to guard against unwanted sales calls, it might have withstood constitutional scrutiny, Stevens wrote.

 

http://www.post-gazette.com/FirstAmendment/top Monday, July 21, 2003

 

USA

June 18, 2002   VNN7390  

Court Tosses Door Solicitations Law

FROM AP

USA, Jun 18 (VNN) — ANNE GEARAN - Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Constitution guarantees religious groups, politicians, Girl Scouts and others the right to knock on their neighbors' doors without stopping at town hall for permission, the Supreme Court ruled Monday in a broad endorsement of free speech rights.

By a vote of 8-1 the high court struck down an Ohio village's law that required anyone going door to door to register with authorities and carry a permit. Violators could be fined $100.

"It is offensive, not only to the values protected by the First Amendment but to the very notion of a free society, that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority.

The mayor of the tiny Stratton, Ohio, population 287, said the law was intended to protect elderly residents against flimflam artists or pesky salesmen. The Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religion mandates doorstep proselytizing, objected, saying the law was largely aimed at keeping them out of town.

The law was too broad and affected too many kinds of encounters, Stevens wrote for himself and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.

He noted that residents could file a form to specifically allow visits from Girl Scouts, Christmas carolers or Halloween trick-or-treaters, among others, but that the law seemed to ban those groups from operating unless they had a permit.

Had the ordinance been narrower, it might have withstood constitutional scrutiny, Stevens wrote for the majority.

Two of the court's most conservative justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, agreed with the outcome of the case but did not sign on to all of Stevens' reasoning.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.

"The court once again reaffirmed the fundamental protection of our public ministry under the First Amendment," church lawyer Paul Polidoro said. "Eight justices of the Supreme Court saw the importance of our public ministry ... and that it deserved all the protection the First Amendment could provide."

The church won victories in the 1930s and 1940s that have helped form the court's modern interpretation of the First Amendment.

Taking note of the World War II-era cases, Stevens wrote: "The value judgment that then motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today."

Stratton Village Solicitor Frank Bruzzese defended the law, saying it was "narrowly drawn to regulate only entry onto private property." Town leaders said they are still evaluating their next step.

Monday's case turned in part on the notion of anonymity when speaking one's mind.

The court already has held that the Constitution gives people the right to anonymously distribute campaign literature. Monday's ruling extends that right to door-to-door soliciting for other causes.

The Jehovah's Witnesses, who count 6 million practicing members worldwide, routinely knock on doors and ask to talk about religion. They often offer biblical tracts and say they accept donations but do not ask for them.

The church argued that it needs no one's permission to pursue its mission, and objected to registering by name for a permit. Someone going door to door may choose to introduce himself but should not be required to do so, the church argued.

Two lower federal courts found the permit rules evenhanded, and the church appealed to the Supreme Court.

The court majority found none of the town's reasoning persuasive.

People who do not want to listen to a political candidate or other canvasser don't have to do so, the court said. Residents may post a "No Solicitations" sign at the door, or simply refuse to engage in conversation.

As for the idea that the law could deter crime, Stevens said it is unlikely that a criminal casing a neighborhood would be put off by the need to get a permit.

Rehnquist's dissent mentioned the killings of two college professors in New Hampshire by two teen-agers who said they got into the house on the pretext of taking a survey.

Stratton's law was intended to address such "very grave risks associated with canvassing," and did not unduly limit free speech, Rehnquist wrote.

Jehovah's Witnesses callers will soon ring doorbells in Stratton, church lawyer Paul Polidoro said.

"Some will be receptive, some not. But it's the homeowner's decision whether to listen or not," Polidoro said.

The case is Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, et al., 00-1737.

http://www.vnn.org/usa/US0206/US18-7390.html  Monday, July 21, 2003

 

 

CHRISTIAN LAW ASSOCIATION

LEGAL UPDATE ON
YOUR RIGHT TO WITNESS

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. __, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002).

Last summer, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that is a big win for soulwinners. The Court held that it is unconstitutional to require door-to-door visitors to obtain a permit before they engage in visitation activities, including soulwinning.

I. SIGNIFICANT FACTS

The Village of Stratton, Ohio, enacted an ordinance that prohibited “canvassers” from “going in and upon” private residential property to promote any “cause” without first obtaining a “solicitation permit” from the mayor’s office (Village of Stratton Ordinance No. 1998-5 §116.01). In order to receive the permit, the ordinance required canvassers to fill out a detailed registration form, which required the following information:

Under the ordinance, a canvasser would, after receiving a permit, be authorized to go upon the premises that he listed on the registration form. However, the canvasser would be required to carry the permit on his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or a resident. Anyone who failed or refused to apply for and receive a solicitation permit prior to engaging in canvassing activities could be charged with a misdemeanor.

II. CONCLUSION

Any law that makes it illegal to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with a governmental official or agency and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills.

III. REASONING

A. The permit requirement places too much of a burden on free speech.

1. Hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism, as old as the history of the printing presses.

2. Pamphlets have proved to be valuable instruments in the dissemination of opinion, and the most effective way of bringing pamphlets to the notice of individuals is their distribution at people’s homes.

3. Door-to-door distribution of literature is essential to poorly financed causes.

4. The permit requirement would have applied to the following speech-related activities:

a. Trick-or-treating;

b. Camp Fire Girls selling cookies or candy;

c. Religious proselytizing;

d. Political campaigning; and

e. Residents promoting a religious or political cause to their neighbor.

5. The permit requirement would effectively ban a significant amount of spontaneous speech. For example:

a. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the required permit.

b. A resident could not go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor until he first obtained the mayor’s permission.

B. The permit requirement is not tailored to the government’s stated interests:

1. Preventing fraud—The permit requirement may advance an interest in preventing fraud if the activities regulated were commercial transactions or the solicitation of funds. However, this interest provides no support for the ordinance’s application to petitioners, to religious canvassers, to political campaigns, or to the enlisting of support for unpopular causes.

2. Preventing crime—The absence of a permit is unlikely to deter criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance, such as asking for directions, requesting permission to use the telephone, or posing as a surveyor or census taker. Neither does the permit requirement preclude a criminal from registering under a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an applicant’s identity or organizational credentials.

3. Protecting residential privacy—Residents have the right to post a no trespassing or no soliciting sign, to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, and to report trespassers or loiterers to the police if their wishes are not honored.

C. Key Quote:

It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but the notion of a free society – that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor’s office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition.
Watchtower, 122 S. Ct. at 2094.

Download the full text (including the majority opinion and all concurring opinions and dissenting opinions) of the Supreme Court’s decision in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton.

http://www.christianlaw.org/watchtower.html  Monday, July 21, 2003

 

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 1 Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 00?737

_________________

WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2002]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy with-out first registering with the mayor and receiving a per-mit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regu-lation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.

I

Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses throughout the United States and pub-lishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah抯 Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders

2 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept

donations.

Petitioners brought this action against the Village and

its mayor in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against

the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance

No. 1998? regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation

on private property in the Village. Petitioners?complaint

alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional

rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech,

and the freedom of the press. App. 10a?4a. The District

Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the

administration of the ordinance and its effect on petition-

ers was introduced.

Section 116.01 prohibits 揷anvassers?and others from

揼oing in and upon?private residential property for the

purpose of promoting any 揷ause?without first having

obtained a permit pursuant to ?16.03.1 That section

棗棗棗

1Section 116.01 provides: 揟he practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.?App. to Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term 揷an-vassers?to include Jehovah抯 Witnesses and the term 揷ause?to include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private property 揻or the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services.?Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 2, 7, 9, the Village抯 ordinance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime.

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 3 Opinion of the Court

provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a 揝olicitation Permit?from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly detailed 揝olicitor抯 Registration Form.2 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds for the denial

棗棗棗

2Section 116.03 provides:

?a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private prop-erty or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes de-scribed in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and ob-taining a Solicitation Permit.

?b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitor抯 Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain the following information:

?1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant抯 residence for five years next preceding the date of registration;

?2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services offered;

?3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact relationship and authority of the Applicant;

?4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is desired;

?5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Reg-istrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and,

?6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its busi-ness or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the nature of the privilege desired.?Brief for Respondents 3a?a.

3Section 116.04 provides: 揈ach Registrant who complies with Sec-

4 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

or revocation of a permit,4 but the record before us does

not show that any application has been denied or that any

permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a

permit.

A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not chal-

lenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may

prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the

resident files a 揘o Solicitation Registration Form?with

the mayor, and also posts a 揘o Solicitation?sign on his

property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property,

unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the 揘o

Solicitation Registration Form?itself.5 Only 32 of the

棗棗棗

tion 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the Registrant抯 Solicitor抯 Registration Form.

揈ach person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.?Id., at 4a.

4Section 116.06 provides: 揚ermits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons:

?a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solici-tor's Registration Form.

?b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor抯 Registra-tion Form.

?c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of conducting the activity.

?d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codi-fied Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law.

?e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property.

?f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this chapter for the original registration.?Id., at 5a.

5Section 116.07 provides, in part: ?a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corpora-tion who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 5 Opinion of the Court

Village抯 278 residents filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, thereby ex-cluding only 揓ehovah抯 Witnesses?and 揚olitical Candi-dates?from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses do not consider themselves to be

棗棗棗

practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solici-tors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads 慛o Solicitation?in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such property.

?b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a 慛o Solicitation Registration Form? at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be com-pleted by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following information: . . . .?Id., at 6a.

6The suggested exceptions listed on the form are:

1. Scouting Organizations

2. Camp Fire Girls

3. Children抯 Sports Organizations

4. Children抯 Solicitation for Supporting School Activities

5. Volunteer Fire Dept.

6. Jehovah抯 Witnesses

7. Political Candidates

8. Beauty Products Sales People

9. Watkins Sales

10. Christmas Carolers

11. Parcel Delivery

12. Little League

13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season

14. Police

15. Campaigners

16. Newspaper Carriers

17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church

18. Food Salesmen

19. Salespersons. App. 229a.

Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.

6 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

搒olicitors?because they make no charge for their litera-

ture or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at

trial that they would honor 搉o solicitation?signs in the

Village. They also explained at trial that they did not

apply for a permit because they derive their authority to

preach from Scripture.7 揊or us to seek a permit from a

municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult

to God.?App. 321a.

Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance

was the product of the mayor抯 hostility to their ministry,

but the District Court credited the mayor抯 testimony that

it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the

Village residents, specifically to protect them 揻rom 慺lim

flam?con artists who prey on small town populations.?61

F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the

court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to

the activities of petitioners as well as to 揵usiness or po-

litical canvassers,?id., at 737, 738.

The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordi-

nance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not

infringe on petitioners?First Amendment rights. The

court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing

constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed

the requirement in ?16.03(b)(5) that the applicant must

list the specific address of each residence to be visited as

potentially invalid, but cured by the Village抯 agreement to

attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737.

Second, it held that petitioners could comply with

?16.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as 搕he

棗棗棗

7Specifically, from the Book of 揗atthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by exam-ple, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And that抯 the activity that Jehovah抯 Witnesses engage in, even as Christ抯 apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.?Id., at 313a?14a.

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 7 Opinion of the Court

Jehovah抯 Witness ministry.?Id., at 738. And third, it

held that ?16.05, which limited canvassing to the hours

before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be re-

placed with a provision referring to 搑easonable hours of

the day.?Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the

ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners

and dismissed the case.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240

F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was 揷ontent

neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject

to intermediate scrutiny.?Id., at 560. It rejected petition-

ers?reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the

free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment

Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.

872 (1990),8 because that 搇anguage was dicta and therefore

not binding.?240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners?

argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it im-

pairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that

we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm地, 514

U. S. 334 (1995), reasoning that 搕he very act of going door-

棗棗棗

The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amend-ment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to relig-iously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304?07 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invali-dating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin

v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school).?494 U. S., at 881 (footnote omitted).

 

88 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities.?240 F. 3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals con-cluded that the interests promoted by the Village棑pro-tecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance敆as well as the harm that it seeks to prevent棑criminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents敆though 揵y no means overwhelming,?were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565?66. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovah抯 Witnesses ministry because those cases either involved a flat prohibition on the dissemi-nation of ideas, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 302 (1940).

In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit re-quirements, the ordinance significantly restricted a sub-stantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Village抯 interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Village 揻ailed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or the efficacy of the restriction.?240 F. 3d, at 572.

We granted certiorari to decide the following question: 揇oes a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one抯 name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or dis-course??534 U. S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9

棗棗棗

9In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual issue embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit contains the speaker抯 name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to answer whether the ordinance抯 registration requirement abridges so much protected speech that it is invalid on its face.

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 9 Opinion of the Court

II

For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions

on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is

more than historical accident that most of these cases

involved First Amendment challenges brought by Jeho-

vah抯 Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is man-

dated by their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsyl-

vania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943), the Jehovah抯 Witnesses

揷laim to follow the example of Paul, teaching 憄ublicly, and

from house to house.?Acts 20:20. They take literally the

mandate of the Scriptures, 慓o ye into all the world, and

preach the gospel to every creature.?Mark 16:15. In doing

so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of

God.?Moreover, because they lack significant financial

resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is

seriously diminished by regulations that burden their efforts

to canvass door-to-door.

Although our past cases involving Jehovah抯 Witnesses,

most of which were decided shortly before and during

World War II, do not directly control the question we

confront today, they provide both a historical and analyti-

cal backdrop for consideration of petitioners?First

Amendment claim that the breadth of the Village抯 ordi-

nance offends the First Amendment.11 Those cases in-

volved petty offenses that raised constitutional questions

of the most serious magnitude梣uestions that implicated 棗棗棗

10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Mar-tin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cantwell

v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).

11The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided in Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness grounds required advance notice to the police before 揷asually soliciting the votes of neighbors.?425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.

10 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our consideration of the ordi-nance at issue here.

First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech in-volved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that 揾and distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism梐s old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. . . . This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exer-cises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.?319 U. S., at 109.

In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the peti-tioner was a Jehovah抯 Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that 損am-phlets have proved most effective instruments in the dis-semination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distri-bution at the homes of the people. On this method of com-munication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventu-ated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a cen-sorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.?Id., at 164

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 1 Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 00?737

_________________

WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[June 17, 2002]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy with-out first registering with the mayor and receiving a per-mit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regu-lation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.

I

Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses throughout the United States and pub-lishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah抯 Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders

2 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept

donations.

Petitioners brought this action against the Village and

its mayor in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against

the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance

No. 1998? regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation

on private property in the Village. Petitioners?complaint

alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional

rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech,

and the freedom of the press. App. 10a?4a. The District

Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the

administration of the ordinance and its effect on petition-

ers was introduced.

Section 116.01 prohibits 揷anvassers?and others from

揼oing in and upon?private residential property for the

purpose of promoting any 揷ause?without first having

obtained a permit pursuant to ?16.03.1 That section

棗棗棗

1Section 116.01 provides: 揟he practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited.?App. to Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term 揷an-vassers?to include Jehovah抯 Witnesses and the term 揷ause?to include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private property 揻or the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services.?Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 2, 7, 9, the Village抯 ordinance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime.

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 3 Opinion of the Court

provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a 揝olicitation Permit?from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly detailed 揝olicitor抯 Registration Form.2 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds for the denial

棗棗棗

2Section 116.03 provides:

?a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private prop-erty or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes de-scribed in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and ob-taining a Solicitation Permit.

?b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitor抯 Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain the following information:

?1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant抯 residence for five years next preceding the date of registration;

?2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services offered;

?3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact relationship and authority of the Applicant;

?4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is desired;

?5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Reg-istrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and,

?6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its busi-ness or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the nature of the privilege desired.?Brief for Respondents 3a?a.

3Section 116.04 provides: 揈ach Registrant who complies with Sec-

4 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

or revocation of a permit,4 but the record before us does

not show that any application has been denied or that any

permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a

permit.

A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not chal-

lenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may

prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the

resident files a 揘o Solicitation Registration Form?with

the mayor, and also posts a 揘o Solicitation?sign on his

property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property,

unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the 揘o

Solicitation Registration Form?itself.5 Only 32 of the

棗棗棗

tion 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the Registrant抯 Solicitor抯 Registration Form.

揈ach person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited.?Id., at 4a.

4Section 116.06 provides: 揚ermits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons:

?a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solici-tor's Registration Form.

?b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor抯 Registra-tion Form.

?c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of conducting the activity.

?d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codi-fied Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law.

?e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property.

?f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this chapter for the original registration.?Id., at 5a.

5Section 116.07 provides, in part: ?a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corpora-tion who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 5 Opinion of the Court

Village抯 278 residents filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, thereby ex-cluding only 揓ehovah抯 Witnesses?and 揚olitical Candi-dates?from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jeho-vah抯 Witnesses do not consider themselves to be

棗棗棗

practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solici-tors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads 慛o Solicitation?in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such property.

?b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a 慛o Solicitation Registration Form? at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be com-pleted by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following information: . . . .?Id., at 6a.

6The suggested exceptions listed on the form are:

1. Scouting Organizations

2. Camp Fire Girls

3. Children抯 Sports Organizations

4. Children抯 Solicitation for Supporting School Activities

5. Volunteer Fire Dept.

6. Jehovah抯 Witnesses

7. Political Candidates

8. Beauty Products Sales People

9. Watkins Sales

10. Christmas Carolers

11. Parcel Delivery

12. Little League

13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season

14. Police

15. Campaigners

16. Newspaper Carriers

17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church

18. Food Salesmen

19. Salespersons. App. 229a.

Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.

6 WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.

VILLAGE OF STRATTON

Opinion of the Court

搒olicitors?because they make no charge for their litera-

ture or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at

trial that they would honor 搉o solicitation?signs in the

Village. They also explained at trial that they did not

apply for a permit because they derive their authority to

preach from Scripture.7 揊or us to seek a permit from a

municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult

to God.?App. 321a.

Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance

was the product of the mayor抯 hostility to their ministry,

but the District Court credited the mayor抯 testimony that

it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the

Village residents, specifically to protect them 揻rom 慺lim

flam?con artists who prey on small town populations.?61

F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the

court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to

the activities of petitioners as well as to 揵usiness or po-

litical canvassers,?id., at 737, 738.

The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordi-

nance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not

infringe on petitioners?First Amendment rights. The

court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing

constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed

the requirement in ?16.03(b)(5) that the applicant must

list the specific address of each residence to be visited as

potentially invalid, but cured by the Village抯 agreement to

attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737.

Second, it held that petitioners could comply with

?16.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as 搕he

棗棗棗

7Specifically, from the Book of 揗atthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as our commission to preach. . . . So Jesus, by exam-ple, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And that抯 the activity that Jehovah抯 Witnesses engage in, even as Christ抯 apostles did after his resurrection to heaven.?Id., at 313a?14a.

 

Cite as: 536 U. S. ____ (2002) 7 Opinion of the Court

Jehovah抯 Witness ministry.?Id., at 738. And third, it

held that ?16.05, which limited canvassing to the hours

before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be re-

placed with a provision referring to 搑easonable hours of

the day.?Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the

ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners

and dismissed the case.

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240

F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was 揷ontent

neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject

to intermediate scrutiny.?Id., at 560. It rejected petition-

ers?reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the

free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment

Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.

872 (1990),8 because that 搇anguage was dicta and therefore

not binding.?240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioner